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STUDENT

NOTES

MANDAMUS AS A REMEDY AGAINST PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS IN KENTUCKY
The common law on the question of mandamus to private corporations is clear and unequivocal. It was early settled that mandamus was an appropriate means to control the operations of private
corporations. 1 It is regarded as the most efficient way for the common law courts to enforce certain obligations of civil corporations 2
The general rule on the subject may be stated as follows: "When the
law imposes a specific duty upon a private corporation and there is
no other specific and adequate remedy provided for its enforcement,
mandamus will lie." 3
The state courts follow the general rule in allowing the writ so
consistently that it may be said to be the overwhelming weight of
authority in this country.' The courts reach this result on various
grounds. Two examples will serve to illustrate the diversity. The
Minnesota court justified the rule in an interesting manner. It held
that since the state had no visitorial power over unincorporated
societies, it was improper to use mandamus against them but since
the state had that power over its private corporations, they were
subject to the writ.' The Florida Court based its result on the common law, discussing it at length, and merely cited the statute without
discussion' Thus, it is demonstrated that although the same resuli
is generally obtained, the rationalization of that result differs among
the various jurisdictions. The result is obtained in three possible
ways: (1) the common law; (2) a statute expressly naming the writ
of mandamus as a remedy against private corporations; and (3) an
extension of existing powers of the state over its private corporations.
The situation in Kentucky presents a confused picture. The
Kentucky Civil Code defines the writ of mandamus as an order of
a court of competent and original jurisdiction to an executive or
ministerial officer.1 There are two cases which established opposite
'HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (3rd ed., 1896) sec. 276.
"Ibid at p. 262.
'34 AM. Jua., Mandamus, sec. 94.
'See American cases collected in 34 Am. JUR., Mandamus, at
p. 882, n. 14.
'State ex rel McGill v. Cook, et al., 119 Minn. 407, 138 N. W.
432 (1912).
"Soreno Hotel Co. v. State ex rel Otis Elevator Co., 107 Fla.
195, 144 So. 339 (1932).
'Kentucky Civil Code (Carroll, 1938), sec. 477: "The writ of
mandamus, as treated of in this chapter, is an order of a court of
competent and original jurisdiction, commanding an executive or
ministerial officer to perform an act, or omit to perform an act, the
performance or omission of which is enjoined by law; and is granted
on the motion of the party aggrieved, or of the commonwealth when
the public interest is affected."
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lines of authority in this state. The first was Cook v. College of Physicians and Surgeois.8 In this case, the court took the position that
the legislature had restricted the application of the writ to certain
classes of persons, regardless of the common law rule, by the adoption of the above code provision. The court emphasized the part of
the provision which said that the writ was addressed to executive
or ministerial officers and said that a private corporation did not
qualify under the definition. This language of the court in applying
the Code to the question is plain:
". ..
the Code of Practice, in its general scope, is not a
statute granting rights, but one defining remedies for the enforcement of rights. In defining the remedy asked for in this
proceeding, it confines its application to certain classes of persons, and the courts cannot, upon the idea that it should be
liberally construed, extend it to other persons than those embraced by the classes named by the legislature."
The other case is Orr v. Bracken County, et al.' In this case, the
court granted a writ of mandamus to compel the officers of a turnpike company to hold an election of officers for the corporation. It
was said that mandamus would lie against a private corporation."'
It is submitted that this case is extremely weak to establish a precedent. There was no discussion or even citation of the earlier
Cook case or of the code provision. In addition, it can well be said
that the Dusiness of operating a turnpike is affected with a public
interest and that, therefore, this was not a case of a purely private
corporation. Yet the subsequent decisions see-saw between the two
cases, following one without mention of the other. Two years later
the court declined to grant the writ against the officers of an incorporated lodge, reverting to the Cook case and the code provision." The
Orr case was not mentioned. The Federal Court was puzzled over
the law of Kentucky in respect to the question." Twenty three years
later the court reversed the sustaining of a demurrer to an application for a writ of mandamus against a private corporation." It
relied upon the Orr case and again neglected to mention the code
provision. The last case which can be found on the subject was
decided three years later. Here, the court went back to the Cook
case and the Code and declared that the writ of mandamus did not
lie against a private corporation. " It was further said that the
'72 Ky. (9 Bush) 541 (1872).
S81 Ky. 593, 5 K. L. R. 632 (1884).
Ibid.. Apparently the sole basis for the decision was a citation
from a treatise by Angell and Ames on Corporations.
" Shmidt v. Abraham Lincoln Lodge, 84 Ky. 490, 2 S. W. 156
(1886).
" For discussion and application of Shmidt and Cook cases by
the Federal Court, see 130 Fed. 251, 256 (1903).
"O'Hara, et al. v. Williamstown Cemetery Co., 133 Ky. 828, 119
S. W. 234 (1909).
' Marion Electric Light and Ice Co. v. Rochester, 149 Ky. 810,
149 S. W. 977 (1912).
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proper remedy in such a case could be secured by means of a mandatory injunction. As far as can be found, this was the last pronouncement by the Kentucky Court on the matter. The court has
stated, by way of dictum in a later case involving an application for
a mandatory injunction against a circuit judge, that a mandatory
injunction is equivalent in legal effect to a mandamus.'
It is submitted that the law in Kentucky on this question is confused because of an unfortunate decision in the Orr case. The
objections to that case have been previously noted. The main objection to that case is that it does not in any way consider the Code.
It would be a strained interpretation, to say the least, to hold
that an executive or ministerial officer and a private corporation
charged with not even a quasi public duty are one and the same
thing. The latest case on the subject reaches the proper result
under the Code and declares the proper remedy to be used.
Therefore, it would appear that the court should overrule the Orr
case to remove this unfortunate decision and its successors as a line
of authority. It may well be argued that Kentucky should follow
the general rule of other states and the common law. The fact
remains, however, that so long as this Code provision with its peculiar wording is retained, that result cannot be reached. The law in
Kentucky today is, and should remain, so long as section 477 of the
Code remains in its present form, that mandamus will not lie against
a private corporation, the proper remedy being by means of the
mandatory injunction.
SCOTT REED.

INSURANCE PAYABLE TO A IIARRIED WOIIAN-EFFECT OF
K.R.S. 297.140
K.R.S. 297.140 provides: "A policy of insurance on the life of
any person expressed to be for the benefit of . . . any married
woman . . . shall inure to her separate use and benefit and that of
her children. .. ."
Where the married woman beneficiary survives the insured no
difficulty arises. The statute is inoperative and the beneficiary takes
the proceeds of the policy under the terms of the contract. No case
has been found that questions her right to the entire proceeds, and it
is very clear that in such a case the statute neither creates a life
estate in the mother with a vested remainder to her children, nor a
joint tenancy. A child takes nothing by virtue of the contract.
Where the beneficiary predeceases the insured and leaves no
children, the statute is also inoperative. Her personal representative takes the proceeds to be distributed according to her will or
the statute of descent and distribution.' But where she predeceases
' 5 Hargis v. Swope, 272 Ky. 257, 114 S. W. (2d) 75 (1938). *
'Bradley v. Bradley's Administrators et al, 178 Ky. 239, 198
S. W. 905 (1917); Buckler et al v. Supreme Council Catholic Knights
of America et al, 143 Ky. 618, 136 S. W. 1006 (1911); Finn et al v.

